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CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS.

T

HE courts and other law writers have experienced great
difficulty in defining an attempt. The difficulty is inherent in the subject matter.! Though the importance
of great care in laying down the law on the subject has been
judicially recognized,2 and it has been said that "the law would
not be a practical system if it did not define with precision the
nature of an attempt," it is nevertheless true that there is no
title less understood by the courts or more obscure in the text
books than that of attempts.!
In the earlier cases punishment for an attempt is spoken of
as if it were punishment for a criminal intent whenever evidenced by an act.' The present doctrine, which regards the
act done in pursuance of the intent as an essential element of
the crime and not merely as evidence of the criminal intent,
probably originated in the Court of Star Chamber, 5 and was
adopted therefrom as a part of the common law by the Court
of King's Bench.6
DEFINITIONS.

Some of the definitions to be found in the books are very absurd. "An attempt in law," says the Standard Dictionary, "is an
act which, if consummated, would effectuate a criminal intent."
"The law as to what amounts to an attempt is of necessity vague."
Stephen's Hist. Crim. Law, Vol. 2, p. 224.
2Kelly v. C. 1 Gr. 489.
'Stokes v. S., 92 Miss. 415; 21 L. R. A. N. S. 901; Hicks v. C., 86 Va.
226.4
Stephen, vol. 2, p. 224.
5
Hudson on Star Chamber.
6

Stephen, vol. 2, p. 223.
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Nothing could be more erroneous. In the first place to constitute
an attempt an act must be consummated,' and in the second
place, if this act completely effectuates the criminal intent, it
ceases to be punishable as an attempt.8 The Century Dictionary
defines an attempt as "an act done in part execution of a design
to commit a crime." The same idea is found in the decisions.!
This definition is too broad. Every act done in furtherance of
a design to commit a crime is not a criminal attempt. To render
it such it must possess certain other characteristics.
This idea is set forth in a recent case,"0 where it is said,
"An attempt, in general, is an overt act done in pursuance of
an intent to do a specific thing, tending to that end but falling
short of complete accomplishment of it. In law the definition
must have this further qualification, that the overt act must be
sufficiently proximate to the intended crime to form one of the
natural series of acts which the intent requires for its full execution."
It may be truly stated that no satisfactory definition of an
attempt has been found in the books." For present purposes it
is sufficient to say that an attempt is an act done in furtherance
of a desigh to commit a crime, which falls short of the complete
accomplishment thereof, but is sufficiently proximate -thereto to
be deemed criminal. This definition is suggestive rather than
precise, and invites inquiry rather than answers it. To answer
such inquiry is the purpose of this article.
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS.

An attempt, like other common law crimes, consists of two
elements,-a criminal intent and a criminal act." The criminal
7

See infra.
C. v. Houssell, 20 D. R. 438.
"'An attempt is an act done with intent to commit a crime." C. v.
Dongherty, 18 D. R. 858. "An attempt is an intent to do a particular
criminal thing with an act toward it falling short of the thing intended."
C. v. Houssell, 20 D. R. 433. See also Smith v. C., 54 Pa. 213 and the
criticism thereof in C. v. Clark, 10 Co. Ct. 447.
10C. v. Eagen, 190 Pa. 10.
"Many definitions are collected in P. v. Young, (Mich.) 47 L. R. A.
110, Graham v. P., 181 Ill. 447, 47 L. R. A. 734, 3 A. &E. Encyc. 251,
Words & Phrases.
'The courts sometimes speaks of an "intentional attempt." See
Butler v. Stockdale, 19 Super. 98. All attempts are intentional. There
is no such thing as an unintentional attempt.
8
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act is composed of a physical and a mental element. This
mental element is known, technically, as the "specific intent."
The
It must be distinguished from the "criminal intent."
former denotes the purpose towards the accomplishment of
which the act is directed; the latter determines that the act so
directed shall be done. The former is an essential element of
the criminal act; the latter is concurrent with but not contained
in the criminal act.1"
DISTINGUISHED

FROAM OTHER CRIDIES.

An attempt is to be distinguished from a solicitation and
One may incur criminal responsibility
from a conspiracy.
by merely soliciting another to commit a crime, whether such
other consents or refuses, and though nothing further is done
towards carrying out the unlawful purpose. If the person to
whom the solicitation is addressed refuses, the solicitor is guilty
of a solicitation; if he consents, both persons are guilty of a conspiracy; in neither case is either party guilty of an attempt.
There is respectable authority for the proposition that a solicitation is an attempt," but the prevailing view, is to the contrary. 5 "In a high moral sense," says Woodward, C. j.,16 "it
may be true that a solicitation is an attempt, but in a legal
sense it is not."
It has been said that an attempt is the act of one who is
himself to commit the intended offense and who, if the offense
is committed will be a principal, while solicitation is the act of
one who means to secure another to commit the intended offense
and who, if the offense is committed, will be (in case of felony)
an accessory before the fact; and that a solicitor to a crime
which he does not intend to join in actually committing is not
guilty of an attempt t" This is incorrect. An attempt to commit a crime is at common law a misdemeanor, and the rule of
the common law is that whatever would make one an accessory
before the fact to a felony makes him a principal in a misdemeanor. Therefore, if A solicits B to commit an offense, and
B consents and does an act sufficiently proximate to the intended
Elementary Law, see. 471.
"Bishop Criminal L. see. 767; C. v. Smith, 6 Phila. 305.
"0C. v. McGregor, 6 D. R. 345. Stabler v. C., 95 Pa. 321.
16Smith v. C., 54 Pa. 213.
17J. H. Beale in 17 H. L. R. 505.
13Robinson
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result to constitute an attempt on his part, A is also guilty of an

attempt though he does no further act toward the commission
of the offense and is not present when the acts upon which
B's responsibility is predicated are committed. 8 This is true
whether the crime attempted was a felony or misdemeanor and
whether A would have been guilty as a principal or as an accessory had the crime attempted been committed.
A conspiracy is not an attempt. "There is a plain and
substantial distinction between a conspiracy and an attempt for
at common law no overt act was necessary to constitute a
conspiracy."" It has been said that a conspiracy is less than
attempt,29 but this statement is not consistent with the well established principle that a conspiracy to commit an act which is
not itself a crime may be criminal. An attempt to commit such
an act would not be criminal.
A distinction is also made and carried into the cases between
an attempt to commit a crime and an assault with intent to
commit a crime."' It has been said that an assault with intent
to commit a crime is necessarily an attempt to commit that
crime but that:an attempt to commit a crime is not necessarily
an assault with intent to commit it.22 In one the question of an
assault is not necessarily involved while in the other an assault
is an essential element and "under many conceivable circumstances all the essential elements of an attempt may be present
and yet no assault be committed." 3 The distinction has been
thus stated; "An assault is an act done toward the commission
of a battery; it must precede the battery but it does so immediately. The next movement would, at least to all appearances, complete the battery. An act constituting an attempt
may be more remote. 2" The importance of the distinction is
well illustrated by those cases which hold that where an attempt
18S. v. Jones, 83 N. C. 605, 35 Am. Rep. 586. Ahl v. C. 6 Gratt. (Va.)
706. 'McDade v. P. 26 Mech. 50.
v. Richardson, 42 Super. 341 per Rice, C. J.
"Hartman v. C. 5 Pa. 60.
"Roos v. S., 16 Wyo. 285. 93 Pac. 299. Garrison v. P. 6 Neb. 74.
Lewis v. S., 35 Ala. 380. C. v. George, 12 Super. 1.
22P. v. Burns (Cal.) 60 L. R. A. 270.
Stokes v. S., 92 Miss. 415. 21
L. R. A. N. S. 898. Fox v.,S., 34- 0. S. 380.
2
3Fox v. S., 340. S. 380.
9C.
2

2

Fox v. S., 34 0. S. S80.
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is made to have intercourse with an infant under the statutory
age of consent, the accused is not guilty of an assault with intent to commit rape if the infant in fact consented, as the consent destroys the element of assault, 5but is guilty of an attempt
to rape.S In Texas it has been held that an assault with intent
to commit rape cannot be made by mere threats without force
or attempted force but that an attempt may.
THE PHYSICAL ACT.

The law does not undertake to punish a mere intent to
commit a crime.' It has been said that this is because the law
cannot regulate the thoughts and intents of the heart. The
best it can do is to punish acts and that it would be unreasonable to require the law "to detect and punish the criminal intent."'
It is accordingly held that in order to constitute one
guilty of an attempt he must have done something more than to
to have formed an intent to commit a crime and that the distinction between an intent and an attempt to commit a crime is that
the former implies purpose only-a mere condition of the mind;
while the latter implies both purpose and an act-a physical endeavor--done to carry that purpose into execution 0 This necessity for the commission of an act has sometimes been expressed by saying that the attempt
must be "actual" and not "con31
structive" or "meditated.'
The physical element of an attempt may be, and frequently
is, a series of physical acts,32 and one may by a single act or
25

The great weight of authority is to the contrary on the ground that
the infant cannot consent to such an assault, 33 Cyc. 1434 but that the
rule stated prevails in Pennsylvania, see Trickett Crim. L. 653.
2123 A. & E. Encyc. 868.
2

1Cox

v. S. (Tex.), 44 S. W. 157.

Burny v. S., 21 Tex. App. 565.

v. McGregor, 6 D. R. 345. Smith v. Blackley, 188 Pa., 206.
In C. v. Randolph, 146 Pa. 94, it is said, "The law takes no cognizance of
an intent existing only in the mind." Where else could an intent exist?
2C.

2Smith

v. C., 54 Pa. 212.

Of course the law cannot punish an "in-

tent." It may however, and frequently does, punish a man, because he
entertained an intent. Whenever the law punishes an actor more severely because he acted with a certain intent, it is in reality punishing
him because of his intent,
30
C.v. Clark, 10 Co. Ct. Rep. 447. C. v. Eagen, 190 Pa. 10. Stabler
v, C., 95 Pa. 321; Kelly v. C., 1 G., 484.
31C. v. Clark, 10 Co. Ct. Rep. 444. Kelly v. C., 1 Grant 484.
32C. v. Tadrick v. C. 1 Super. 566. C. v. Eagen, 190 Pa. 10. C. v.
Clark, 10 Co. Ct. Rep. 446.
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series of acts endeavor to accomplish two or more crimes, in
which case he may be punished for an attempt to commit either
crime. 3 The same act or series of acts may constitute a substantive crime-and an attempt to commit another crime. Thus
breaking and entering a dwelling house in the night with the
intention of committing rape constitutes burglary and also an
attempt to rape.34 Indeed a very common class of attempts is
where the act performed is itself a crime but which bezomes
aggravated by the unfulfilled specific intent with which it is
committed.
The act need not be per se criminal. An act which otherwise is innocent or praiseworthy may, if accompanied by the
requisite intent, be indictable as an attempt. Thus one who
enters a house and takes a seat upon the bed at the instance of
the owner is guilty of an attempt to commit larceny, if he entered and sat upon the bed with the intention of stealing money
35
which was hidden in the bed.
Not every act committed in furtherance of a design to commit crime is an attempt. This is true even though the act is
unlawful irrespective of its being done in furtherance of such
design. It has been said that when the first unlawful act in the
direction of the commission of a crime, however slight, is com6
This is clearly incorrect. The
mitted, the crime is complete.
act whether Per se lawful or unlawful must be proximate to the
intended result. If A, intending to poison B, should a year
before the contemplated poisoning, steal poison with which to
do it, he would not be guilty of an attempt to kill, nor is one
who, intending to burglarize a house, enters the yard, guilty of
'
an attempt to commit burglary.
THE SPECIFIC INTENT.
A specific intent to commit a certain crime is an essential
38
This is true
element of an attempt to commit that crime.
33C. v. Eagen, 190 Pa. 10.
3
'Kelly v. C., 1 Gr. 484.
3C. v. Tadrick, 1 Super. 555. See also Rex v. Simons, 1 Wils. 329.
But see dictum contra C. v. Eagen, 190 Pa. 10.
36C. v. Clark, 10 Co. Ct. Rep. 446, per Pennypacker, J.
37
C. v. Eagen, 190 Pa. 10. But in Kelly v. C., 1 Gr. 494, the court
seems to have been of the opinion that whether certain acts constitute an
attempt may depend upon whether these acts are otherwise criminal.
•8Kelly v. C. 1 Gr. 484. Stabler v. C., 95 Pa. 318. C. v. Tadrick 1,
Super. 566. Mears v. C. 2 Gr. 387.
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whcther or not a specific intent is an essential element of the
crime attempted. Thus one who kills another may be guilty of
murder though he did not intend to kill, but one cannot be
guilty of an attempt to murder unless he acted with the intention
of committing murder which includes an intent to kill.39 This rule
does not require that the actor should know or believe that the acts
which he attempts would, if consummated, constitute a crime.
His opinion as to the innocence or criminality of his actions
is immaterial. It is sufficient if he intends to do certain acts if
these acts constitute a crime.
The correctness of the rule requiring a specific intent has
not been questioned where the act done could not have effected
the crime intended unless followed by other acts, but there is
apparent authority for the proposition that an act is punishable
as an attempt if, supposing it to have produced its natural and
probable effect. it would have amounted to a substantive crime,
even though the act was not done with the intention of producing that effect.
The theory of the latter doctrine is that as one is frequently
held criminally responsible for the effect of his acts, though he
acted without the intention of producing such effect, if it was
the natural and probable consequence of his acts, he should not
escape punishment altogether, if his acts, in spite of their natural tendency, do not, in a particular case, produce the effect
which the law declares to be a substantive crime. The doctrine
has not met with much favor, and, though it may be admitted
that the actor is under such circumstances deserving of punishment, it certainly does violence to the English language to hold
him guilty of an attempt.
The specific intent must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt to have existed in the mind of the accused as a matter of
fact.4" Its existence may be inferred from the circumstances
and need not, and ordinarily cannot, be proved by positive evidence, 3 but whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial the
jury must be persuaded of the existence of this intent as a mat"C. v. Brosk, 8 D. R. 639.
4
'Holmes, Common Law, 66, Reg. v. Delworth, 2 M. & R. 531.
Jones, 5 C. &P. 258.
1'2Kelly v. C. 1 Gr. 484.
1SC. v. Bell, 13 Super. 579. C. v. Manfredi, 162 Pa. 144.

R. v.
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ter of fact." It cannot be inferred as a matter of law from the
acts done. To hold otherwise would be very absurd. The
charge is that an act has become criminal or its criminal character has been aggravated by reason of the intent with which
it was committed, and it would not be reasonable to infer the
existence of this intent as a matter of law from the acts done
and then enhance the criminality of these acts by adding this
intent.
The specific intent must accompany all of the acts which
are relied upon as constituting a part of the attempt.45 Thus if
one should go to a certain place with the intention of robbing
another and then strike him with the changed purpose of killing
him, and then resolve again upon robbery, but before taking
further steps should be frightened away, he could not be punished for an attempt to rob.
The adcused must have had sufficient mental capacity to entertain the requisite specific intent. Such capacity is presumed
but may be disproved by evidence Nhich indicates that at the time
of the commission of the physical act his mind, from any cause
whatever, was in such a condition that he could not conduct the
mental operations which enter into the formation of the particular intent. The test of this capacity is by no means the
same as the test of criminal responsibility. A person may be
old enough and sane enough to to be criminally responsible for
his external conduct and yet incapable of so estimating ends
and selecting means for their accomplishment as to form a
specific design to commit a certain crime.46 For example, the
fact that a man was drunk does not ordinarily excuse him from
criminal responsibility for his acts, but if one is accused of an
attempt the actual condition of his mind is open to investigation,
and if he were too drunk at the time he did the physical acts, to
put together the factors of the intellectual problem and correllate
them in a definite purpose to commit a particular crime, the
mental portion of the criminal act constituting the attempt is
wanting and he is not guily."7
44

C. v. Bell, 13 Super. 579.
15Kelley v. C 1 Gr. 484, C v. Tadrick 1 Super. 566.
"Robinson's Elementary Law 471.
473

A&E. Encyc. 263.
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A CRIME MUST HAVE BEEN INTENDED.

If, as a matter of law, the results intended, if accomplished
precisely as intended, would not have constituted a crime, an
attempt to accomplish these results is not a criminal attempt.48
Thus an accomplished suicide is not a crime and therefore an
attempt to commit suicide is not a criminal attempt; 9 a husband
who attempts to have carnal knowledge of his wife forcibly and
against her will is not guilty of an attempt to rape because, if he
had fully accomplished his purpose, he would not have been
guilty of rape;' one who forcibly compels another to write an
order intending to take the order is not guilty, according to the
common law, of an attempt to rob because he would not have
been guilty of robbery had he accomplished his purpose;5 where
it is not an offense to cause an abortion unless the woman is
"quick," an attempt to produce an abortion of a woman who
is not quick is not a criminal attempt."
The reasons for this doctrine are sufficiently obvious. The
required specific intent is lacking and, as a matter of practical
common sense, it would be unjust to punish one for attempting
to do a thing for which, if it had been fully accomplished, he
would not have been punishable.
It will be observed, however, that in all of the cases cited
the actor would not have been guilty of a crime had he committed all of the acts which he intended to commit and accomplished
the precise results which he intended to accomplish. A
distinction has been taken between the results which the actor
intended to accomplish and the acts which he intended to do, and
it has been said that "the important question is what is the
physical act which the defendant has set out to do;" for "an
attempt must be a step toward a forbidden physical act" and
"ifthe entire physical act which he set out to perform might
have been accomplished without committing a substantive
crime, the attempt, not being an actual step toward a criminal
48C.

v. Wright 11. D. R. 144, C. v. Dougherty 18 D. R. 958.

19C. v. Wright 11. D. R. 144, May v. Pennel 101 Me. 516, 7 S. R. A.

N. S. 286.
5Trazer v. S. 48 Tex. Crim. 142, 13 Ann. Cas. 497.
51
Rex. v. Edwards 6 C. & P. 521.
512S.
v. Cooper 22 N. J. L. 52. In Mills v. C. 13 Pa. 630 the defendant
was held guilty because in Penna. one may be guilty of an abortion altho
the woman was not quick. See also infra Personal Incapacity.
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act, cannot be criminal."

13

To illustrate this distinction the

following cases are given: A, wishing to kill his enemy, shoots
toward an imperfectly seen object which he believes to be his
enemy. The object proves to be a stump. He is not guilty of
an attempt because though the ultimate result which he intended to bring about-the death of his enemy-was criminal, the
physical act which he intended to commit,-bring a bullet in
contact with a stump, -was not. On the other hand, if the object aimed at had in fact been the actor's enemy who wore armor
capable of stopping a bullet, A would have been guilty of an attempt because if he had brought about the intended contact with
the body at which he shot he would have been guilty of a crime.
Again, should a man mistake an effigy in female dress for a
woman and undertake to ravish it, he would not be guilty of an
attempt to rape because the law holds the ravishment of an inanimate object not to be rape, but if he had undertaken to
ravish a real wcnan he would have been guilty of an attempt
though the woman was so strong that he was unable to accomplish his purpose.54
The distinction thus stated and illustrated has been criticised;55 the cases cited as illustrations of it could have been decided in the same way by the application of another undisputed
principle;5" and there are cases which cannot be reconciled with
it. It has been held that one may be convicted of an attempt to
obtain property by false pretences though the person to whom
the pretences were addressed knew of their falsity and could
not therefore, be deceived thereby 7 and that one may be convicted of an attempt to extort money through fear although the
person to whom the threats were addressed could not, under the
existing circumstances, be frightened thereby. 5 The physical
acts intended in the first of these cases were the addressing of
false pretences to a certain mind and the obtaining of property,
and in the second the addressing of threats to a certain mind
and the obtaining of property. The accused would not have
H. Beale in 16 Har. L. R. 492.
Kunkle v. S., 32 Ind. 230. Bishop Crim. L. 742.
N. Y. S. 586.
55
Clark's Crim. L. 134, 16 H. L. R. Anon. Note.
5J.

54

56

P. v. Moran, 7

See infra Proximity.
5'Reg. v. Mills, 7 Cox, 263. Symon's Case 29 Co. Ct. 116.
58P. v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119.
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been guilty of the substantive crime in either case if he had
done both of the acts intended, unless his pretences had caused
belief and his threats had caused fear. If it is impossible to
kill a dummy or ravish a stump, it is equally impossible to deceive a knowing mind or frighten a fearless mind. In either
case the actor may succeed in doing the act which he intended
to do, to wit, bring a bullet in contact with a certain body or the
pretence in contact with a certain mind; in neither is he able to
accomplish the precise results which he intended. The cases
cannot be distinguished and sufficiently indicate that the distinction under discussion will not reconcile all the cases.
THE CHARACTER OF THE CRIME ATTEMPTED.

It is settled beyond question that an attempt to commit a
felony, common law or statutory, is indictable at common law, 9
and it has been frequently stated that an attempt to commit a
a misdemeanor, common law or statutory, is indictable at common law.60
In other jurisdictions, however, it has been held that an
attempt to commit a misdemeanor which is purely statutory and
not ma/urn in se is not indictable at common law.6'
Whether this qualification of the rule as generally stated
prevails in Pennsylvania, has not been expressly decided. It
has been said that "there may be, ferhapis, a distinction between
misdemeanors which are mala in se and such as are mala prohibita, as in case of acts which are not penal perse but are made
the subject of a statutory fine as a matter of municipal regulation. But when a misdemeanor is stamped as a crime by law,
and is punishable by fine and imprisonment, an attempt to commit it is clearly a misdemeanor," 6 and in a recent case the
court, without denying or asserting the existence of this qualification, held that it did not apply to an attempt to obtain property by false pretences because obtaining property by false pre19Smith v. C., 54 Pa. 209.

Randolph v. C., 6 S. & R. 397. Symon's
Case, 29 Co. Ct. 616.
6°Smith v. C., 54 Pa. 209. C. v. Rodman, 34 Super, 612. C. v. Rice,
28 Co. Ct. 752. C. v. Morton, 1 Kulp, 276. C. v. Jones, 10 Phila. 211.
6t3 A. & E. Encyc. 253, 12 Cyc. 177, "The application of the law of
attempts to such offenses would be irrational as well as inconvenient.."
Crim. Law Mag. vol. 4, p. 14 per Wharton.
62C. v. Jones, 10 Phila. 211.

254

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

tences was morally wrong of itself and not simply wrong because prohibited by statute.6
There is authority for the proposition that there can be no
attempt to commit a crime which is itself a mere attempt to do
an act or accomplish a result." Thus it has been held that
there cannot be an attempt to commit embracery because embracery itself "consists of a mere attempt to do an act or accomplish a result.""
It has also been held that there cannot be an attempt to
commit an assault because an assault is itself merely an attempt
to commit a battery." According to the weight of authority,
however, one may be guilty of an assault without having attempted a battery, and if it is held that there cannot be an attempt to commit such an assault, it must be upoir some other
principle than that there cannot be an attempt to commit an attempt.67
By some courts it is held that there cannot be an attempt
to commit aggravated assaults because aggravated assaults- are
nothing more than attempts to commit robbery, rape, murder,
etc.," but in New York a sentence for an attempt to commit an
assault in the first degree (which was defined by statute as an
assault with .a deadly weapon with intent to kill) was sustained
by the Supreme Court saying, "To make the assaultitself it was
"Symons' Case, 29 Co. Ct. 606 "The distinctioi is not well established or well founded." S. v. Butler (Wash.) 35 Pac. 1093.
6112 Cyc. 179, 3 A. & E. 253, "The refinement and metaphysical
acumen that can see a tangible idea in "an attempt to attempt to act"
is too'great for practical use. It is like conceiving of the beginning of
eternity or the starting place of infinity." Wilson v. S., 5 Ga. 305. "An
attempt to attempt is hardly understandable." Rex v. Menary 23 Ont.
L. Rep. 323. Palmer v. P., 32 Ill. 359.
"S. Sales, 2 Nev. 778: "any attempt or effort to corruptly influence
a juror, whether it be successful or not, is itself embracery."
"Wilson v. S., 53 Ga. 205, Reg. v. King, 14 Cox, 434. In Rex v.
Menary, 23 Ont. L. Rep. 320, Meredith, J., said "It is not necessary to
consider whether there can be such an offense as an attempt to commit
an assault, but as assaults are in many cases no more than attempts I do
not at present see how there can be.
67
An attempt to commit a simple assault without battery would
probably be regarded as of too slight consequence to deserve punishment.
In Leblanc v. Reg. 2 Quebec it was held that a verdict of attempt to as.
sault wes not irregular.
GClark & Marshall 179. Brown v. S., 7 Tex. App. 569.
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necessary that the defendant should be so near as to be able to
strike him and should attempt to do so. To make an atempft to
assaultrequired no more than that the defendant should arm
himself with a weapon and endeavor to place himself in a posi69
tion to use it in the execution of his intention to kill."
There are a number of statutory crimes which are generally
classed as aggravated assaults which involve the actual infliction
of corporal injury. Of course there can be an attempt to commit these crimes."
The Supreme Court of Washington has held that where the
the commission of a crime requires the cooperation of two persons, one person alone can not be guilty of an attempt to commit the crime and that, therefore, it being impossible for one
person alone to commit adultery, one person can no more attempt to commit adultery than he can attempt to commit riot.7

This is not the law. Irn states where the consent of both parties
to the carnal knowledge is an essential element of incest, it has
been held a man who atttempts to have carnal knowledge
cf a woman within the prohibited degrees of relationship,
is guilty of an attempt to commit incest, tho the woman
refuses to have such intercourse,"2 and in states where a solicitation is considered an attempt, a solicitation to commit adultery
has been held indictable.
A California case is sometimes cited for the proposition that
an attempt to suborn perjury is not an offense at common law. 3
The court simply decided that an information which charged
that the defendant had "attempted to procure another to commit
perjury" without alleging the acts done, etc. was insufficient.
4
An attempt to suborn perjury is a crime at common law.
PROXIMITY.

The law does not punish as an attempt every act which is
done in furtherance of a design to commit a crime and one of
6P. v. Connell, 14 14. Y. S. 485. S. v. Herron, 12 Minn. 230, 29 Pac.
819 accord. S. v. Woods, 19 S. D. 260 quere. These decisions are consistent with those which hold that an attempt to commit a crime differs

from an assault with intent to commit a crime. See ante.
70C. v. Baker 18. D. R. 1018.
7"S. v. Butler Wash. 33 Pac. 111.
12p. v. Gleagon 99 Cal. 359, 33 Pac. 111.
-3.
A. & E. Ency. C. 253, citing P. v. Thomas 63. Cal. 482.
7'S. v. Holding 1. McCord S. C. 31 See 17 Ann Cas. 1582.
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the chief difficulties in the law of attempts is in determining the
relation which the act done must sustain to the intended offense.
It has been stated in varying language that the act done
5
must closely approximate the actual commission of the offense.
Thus it has been said that the act done "must proximately lead
to the commission of the crime,' "" "must be proximate ani not
remote, " "must be sufficiently proximate to the intended crime
to form one of the natural series of acts which the intent requires for its full execution."8
It is frequently said that the act done must amount to more
than mere preparation 9 but what constitutes mere- preparation
is nowhere definitely stated. Indeed the term "preparation"
seems to be a mere catchword used by the judges to designate
those acts which they do not think sufficiently proximate to be
attempts. In some cases the term is used to designate those
acts which precede the last act which is contemplated by the
actor as necessary to effectuate the crime, but under this definition some acts of preparation may amount to an attempt, for it
is well settled that the act done need not be "the last proximate
act prior to the consummation of the attempted crime.' '
Occasionally it is said that the act must be one "which will
apparently result in the crime unless interrupted by some intervening cause independent of the actor's will" 8 or "by extraneous
circumstances over which he had no control." 82 Such statements are incorrect. Acts which fail to accomplish an intended
crime are frequently punishable as attempts although the failure was not due to causes over which the defendant had no control. An act may constitute an attempt although to complete
the crime it must be followed by other acts of the defendant
himself and one may be guilty of an attempt although he re7

-See S. v. Hurley 79. Vt.
,6C. v. Fhaherty 25 Super. 492.
"1C. v. Clark 10 Co. Ct. 444.
78C. v. Eagen 190 Pa. 10.

-9C. v. MacGregor, 6 D. R. 345. C. v. Eagen, 190 Pa. 10. C.v.
Fhaherty, 25 Super. 492.
80C. v. Tadrick, 1 Super. 566.
C. v. Eagan, 190 Pa. 10, C. v. Rodman, 34 Sup. 608. C. v. George, 12 Super 1. C. v. Bell, 13 Sup. 579.
Stabler v. C., 95 Pa. 392. C. v. Clark, 10 Co. Ct., 444.
81
C. v. MacGregor, 6 D. R. 345.
2
8 C. v. Tadrick, 1 Super. 566.
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pented and gave up the project. Both of these cases are opposed to the test just stated. Indeed under such a test one
who shot at another but missed because his pistol was poorly
aimed would not be guilty.
Common types of attempt are: (1) an act which sets in
motion natural forces which would accomplish the crime in the
expected course of events but for an unsebn interruption as, for
instance, where a candle is lighted and placed so that it will
eventually set fire to a house but is blown out by the winds or
put out by the police; (2) an act which would accomplish the
crime but for a mistake of judgment in a matter of nice estimate,
as where a pistol is fired at a man but the bullet misses him.
In either of these cases the actor has done his last act.3
Where the act done is such that further acts are contemplated by the actor as necessary before the substantive crime
can be committed, the question is one of proximity for the solution of which the courts have furnished no simple and infallible test. It has been truly said that it is impossible to
formulate a rule "which will reconcile the existing authorities
and serve as a guide in all future cases."'" The question must
be determined on the facts of each case with references to the
greatness of the crime attempted and the degree of apprehension
which it is calculated to excite. The analogies furnished by
other cases will usually be too imperfect to give much "help and
it is impossible to decide any case without doing violence to
some author or some adjudicated case." ' The degree of proximity required is perhaps inversely proportional to the gravity
of the crime and the apprehension which it is calculated to excite.5
A series of dicta and decisions by the Peinsylvania courts
will illustrate the nicety of the distinctions involved. X, intendto commit burglary procures a complete set of burglar implements; he is not guilty of an attempt. He meets a confederate
at a distance from the house; he is not guilty. He walks toward
the house; he is not guilty. He arrives in front of the house
and watches it; he is not guilty. He prepares some of his im81.v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267.
84

Stokes v. S., 92 Miss. 415,

21 L. R. A. N. S. 898.

Asso. 6 N. D. 437, 40 L. R. A. 437.
8
"Stokes v. S., 92 Miss. 415, 21 L. R. A. W. S. 901.
8See C. v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18.

Cornwell v.
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plements; he is not guilty." He breaks the gate of the yard; he
He enters the yard without breaking the gate;
is guilty.'
he is not guilty." He hides in the barn; he is not guilty. He
assaults the owner in the yard; he is guilty." He goes upon the
steps; he is guilty. 9 He inserts key in lock or places a ladder
against the window; he is guilty." He removes moulding or
breaks transom; he is guilty.9
Usually an act which is expected to bring about the desired
result without further interference on the part of the actor is
sufficiently proximate, but this is not always so. Thus soliciting another to commit a crime and handing the instrument
with which to commit it is not an attempt. 2
FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPT.

"A failure to consummate the intended crime is as much
an element of an attempt as the specific intent and the overt
act.""3 The failure of an attempt maybe due to an abandonment
of the criminal desigu or to the impossibility of its consummation. This impossibility may be due to (1) the personal incapacity of the actor; (2) the inadequacy of the means used; (3)
the non-existence or unsuitability of the object upon which the
criminal act is to operate. 9'
PERSONAL INCAPACITY OF THE ACTOR.

The incapacity of the actor may be either legal or physical.
A person is legally incapable of commiting a crime when the
law holds him not to be guilty although he has done the precise physical acts which constitute the crime. Where one is
legally incapable of committing a crime he cannot be guilty of
an attempt to commit that crime. Accordingly, in those jurisdictions where it is held that a boy under fourteen is incapable

811C. v. Eagan 190 Pa. 10, C. v. Clark 10 Co. Ct. 444.
86C. v. Smith 6 Phila. 305.
81C. v. Eagan 190 Pa. 10.

83C. v. Eagan.
9C. v. Clark 10 Co. Ct. 444.
90C. v. Smith 6 Phila. 305.
9C. v. Fhaherty 25 Super 490, C. v. Morton I Kulp 280.
92Stabler v. C. 95 Pa. 318.
9C. v. Housell 20 D. R. 433.
"These three causes of impossibility are closely related but for convenience will be discussed separately.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
of committing rape, it is also very properly held-that he cannot
be guilty of an attempt to commit rape. 95 Had he done all that
he had intended to do, he would not have been guilty of rape.
Consequently any steps falling short- of success cannot be an
attempt to rape.9 6 This doctrine has been criticized on the
ground that "an intention to do an act does not necessarily imply an ability to do it''"" but this criticism loses sight of the fact
that the boy is not exempted from responsibility for the completed crime only in case he cannot perform the physical acts
involved therein, but whether he can perform them or not, and
even though he does actually perform them.
A person is physically incapable of committing a crime
when he cannot perform the physical acts which constitute the
crime. In the ordinary affairs of life one frequently attempts
to do things which he is physically incapable of doing and there
seems to be no good reason why the law should hold that one
cannot attempt a crime which he is physically incapable of committing. Accordingly it is held that physical incapacity unknown the accused is not a defense to a charge of attempt. 9
Thus one who is impotent may be guilty of an attempt to rape,9
and in jurisdictions where there is a prima facie, but not conclusive, presumption that a boy under fourteen years is physically incapable of committing rape, it should also be held that
such a boy may be convicted of an attempt to commit rape,
whether he is physically capable of completing the offense or
not, because had he done all that he intended to do he would
have been guilty of rape. 99
INADEQUACY

OF MEANS

There has been a considerable discussion in the cases as to
the extent to which the means employed must be adopted to the
953 A. & E. Encyc. 270, 11 Ann. Cas. 1064.
96

See Supra. A crime must have been intended.
97C. v. Green 2 Peck 380. J. H. Beale in 16 Har. L. R. 499. Davidson v. C. 20 Ky. L. R. 540, 47 S. W. 313.
983 A & E Encyc. 270, contra Nugent v. S. 18 Ala. 521.
9
Terr v. Keyes 5 Dak. 244, 38 N. W. 440.
' 99CIark Crim. L. 136. It has been held, however, that where the
presumption of incapacity is merely prima facie one cannot be convicted
of an attempt in absence of evidence showing that he was capable of
completing the crime. S. v. Fisk, 15 N. Dak. 589. It is difficult to
justify these decisions,
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accomplishment of the intended crime. In a few cases it has
been held that the means employed must be actually capable of
accomplishing the intended result.' This doctrine unduly limits the law of attempts. The reason why an attempt is not effectual is generally the inadequacy of the means employed.!
Moreover, of what means can it be said that they are absolutely
capable of producing an intended result? Of what poison can it
be said that it will not, in the person for whom it is prepared,
find a system so tempered by antidotes as to resist its effects?
How can it be surely proved that a particuilar wound will be
deadly.3 And if the means are apparently adequate the effect
upon the public and upon the person against whom the attempt is
directed is the same as if the means were actually adequate. The
overwhelming weight of authority is therefore to the effect that
the means employed need not be actually adequate.4
By a number of authorities it is said that the means employed must not be obviously unsuitable5 and that therefore an
attempt to kill by witchcraft or by striking with a small stick is
not a criminal attempt.6 The fact that the means used were
obviously inadequate would be evidence that the accused did
not intend to commit the crime 7 but the present doctrine seems
not to be thus limited in its effect. That the actor thought the
means were suitable is not sufficient if they were obviously unsuitable. "When the means used are so preposterous that
there is not even apparent danger then an indictable attempt is
not made out." 8
It is frequently said that it is necessary that the means
should be apparently adequate9 but what is meant by apparent
adequacy is nowhere sufficiently explained. Under this view
1
See Bishop Grim. L. sec. 740. Clarissa v. S., 11 Ala. 37. S. v.
Swails, 8 Ind. 525. Henry Vr.S., 18 Ohio, 32.
2
Mullen v. S., 45 Ala. 43.
34 Crim. L. Mag. 12.
43 A. & E. Encyc. 267. Clark and Marshall 187.
5
Bishop Grim. L. 749. Clark and Marshall 187.
6
Att. Gen. v. Sillen, 2 H. & C. 525. Kunkle v. S., 32 Ind. 420.
7
Kunkle v. S., 32 Ind. 231.
8
Wharton Crim. L. 183. See C. v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 137.
93 A. & E. Encyc. 267. Bishop Grim. L. 738, 750. Clark & Marshall,
187 and cases cited.
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it is always necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, that the
means appear adequate to the actor, and it has been said that if
the means appear adequate to both the actor and the person
against whom the attempt is directed an attempt is made out, 10
but this is not necessary for an attempt may be directed against
a person who is absolutely unconscious thereof." One author
has said that the means "must be, to the apprehension of a reasonable man, calculated to effect the purpose," '2 and another that
"even the outward seeming adaptation need not be perfect" for
"in most cases wherein an attempt has failed a careful observer
could have discerned the defects which lead to failure" and that
"'if such defect was not absolutely obvious even to the casual
eye" the attempt should be punishable- because "it did not
prevent the disquiet against which the criminal law protects the
community.'
The test applied by some courts is that of proximity in the
determination of which the courts have considered the gravity
of the crime attempted, the uncertainty of the result, the seriousness of the apprehension felt, the nearness of the act done
to the result intended, the harm likely to result from the act
even though it does not effect the result intended, and from
there considerations have decided whether the act done was deserving of punishment."
Applying these doctrines it has been held that one may
commit an attempt by pointing an empty' 5 or defectively loaded 6
gun, or by administering poison in such quantity1 7 or form" as
to be harmless.
There appear therefore to be three theories as to the adequacy of the means used, each of which finds some support in
the cases, which have been classified as follows: (1) the subjective theory; (2) the objective theory; (3) the relative sub1Wharton Crim. L. 182.
"Chapman v. S., 78 Ala. 463.
12May Crim. L. 184.
"Bishop Crim. L. 750.
'4See.C. v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18.
15S. v. Shepard, 10 Ia. 126.
'6Mullen v. S., 45 Ala. 43.
17C.

v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18.

"'Reg. v. Cluderoy 61 C. C. L. 90.
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jective theory. According to the first it is sufficient that the
actor thought that the means which he employed were adequate;
according to the second the means employed must be actually
adequate; according to the third which is asserted by the weight
of authority the means employed must be "apparently adequate."
UNSUITABILITY

OF OBJECT.

A similar conflict exists in the authorities as to the rule to
be applied where the attempt fails of success because of the
non-existence or unsuitability of the object upon which the
criminal act is to operate.
The question has frequenly arisen where an attempt to
pick an empty pocket was made. In an early English case
such an act was held not to be punishable as an attempt because
"an attempt can only be made out when, if no interruption
had
taken place, the attempt could have been carried out successfully.' ' 19 This case was subsequently overruled in England
and it is now the settled rule in both England and the United
States that an attempt to pick a pocket is a criminal attempt
though unknown to the actor the pocket was empty. 0 In an
early Pennsylvania case it was held that an indictment for an
assault.with intent to steal was sufficient though it did not state
the particular goods which the defendant intended to steal.
Duncan, J., said, "The intention of the person was to pick the
pocket of whatever he found in it and although there might be
nothing in the pocket the intention was the same.'"2 Similarly
it has been held that one may be guilty of an attempt to steal
from an empty safe22 or drawer."
The doctrine of these cases has been extended to other cases.
Thus it has been held that one may be guilty of an attempt to
commit an abortion upon a woman who was not pregnant, 4 of an
19

Reg. v. Collins, 9 Cox GC.
C. 497 Beale 138.
"Reg. v. Brown, 24 Q. B. D. 359, 3 A. & E. Encyc. P. v. Moran, N.
Y., 10 L. R. A. 111.
2"Rogers v. C. 5 S. & R. 463.
2Harvick v. S. 49 Ark. 519.
2"Clark v. S. 86 Tenn. 311. See also S. v. Heal, 370 S. 108. These
cases are not inconsistent with the proposition that the physical act which
the actor intends to do must constitute a crime because the physical act
intended was not merely the putting of the hands in the pocket, etc., but
also clasping it around something in the pocket and pulling it out.
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attempt to obtain money by false pretence from one who knew
that the pretences were false,5 of an attempt to extort money
from one who could not be frightened because acting in concert
with the police," of an attempt to enlist for foreign service one
who was not physically fit to be accepted,2 of an attempt to bribe
a public officer tho the officer had no legal authority to bring
about the result desired.'
In all of these cases the actor must
be ignorant of the fact that the object upon which the act is intended to operate does not exist or is unsuitable. Otherwise the
requisite specific intent would necessarily be lacking.2
Relying upon there cases it has been stated as a general
proposition that where an act is done with intent to commit a
crime, it constitutes a criminal attempt altho because of the
non existance or unsuitability of the object to be operated upon
the consummation of the crime is impossible. 0 This proposition
cannot be accepted without qualification. The aim of the law
is not to punish sins but to prevent certain external results and
an act tho done with intent to commit a crime may create no
apparent danger and no perturbation in the peaceful order of
things and be therefore too small for the law to notice. To constitute an attempt "the act must be sufficient in magnitude and
proximity and of such apparent aptitude as is calculated to create
to outside observation an apprehended danger of its commission.", 2 The text writers and courts are therefore agreed that one
who attempts to ravish an effigy or who shoots at a dummy or
shadow is not guilty of an attempt. 2 If, however, the person intended to be killed was so near that shooting at the shadow or
dummy endangered or causeed him to fear for his life it would be
of sufficient importance for the law to notice and an attempt would
be made out. Thus where a man,shot at a particular spot on a
2

1R. v. Goodchild 61 E. C. L. 293. 3 A. & E.Encyc. 27.
25P. v. Mills. 7 Cox. 263, Beale, 727, Symons Case 29 Co. Ct. 606.
26p.

2

v. Gardner 144 N. Y. 119.

v. Jacobs 9, Allen 275.
sIn Re Bozeman 42 Kan. 451, 22 Pac. 638.
1C.

293.

A. & E. Ency C. 272.

303 A. & E. Encyc. 271, See also Bishop Crim. L. 752, Clark Crim.
L. 130.
31Bishop Crim. L. 737.
32Clark Crim. L. 134, May Crim. L. 168, Reg. v. Pherson, Dears &
B. Crim. Cas. 201, P. v. Gardner, 25 N. Y. S. 1072.
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roof or into a particular room where he supposed another was located, he was guilty of an attempt, tho the other was really at
another point on the roof or in another room.'
The general doctrine that a person attempting to commit a
crime, which under the circumstances he is incapable of commiting, may be criminally responsible, as applied to cases where
the act done is not criminal apart from the specific intent with
which it is done, has been criticised on the gTound that under
it persons are punished simply for a mental error. The actor
would not have performed the act if he had known that he could
not consummate the crime and as his act is not criminal
apart from his intent his sole guilt consists in a mental error, in
falsely supposing that an act innocent in itself would accomplish
an unattainable result. 3'
ABANDONMENT OF THE CRIMINAL DESIGN.

One who has resolved to commit a crime and has proceeded
so far in its execution that his acts amount to a criminal attempt
may abandon his evil design and thereby prevent its complete
accomplishment. It is universally held that where such abandonment is involuntary, e. g. because of fear of detection, belief
of physical inability, etc., it is not a defense, but there is authority to the effect that where such abandonment is free and
voluntary, there being no outside causes prompting it, the rule
is different. 5 This doctrine, which is based on the theory that
the offender so long as he is capable of arresting his evil purpose should be encouraged to do so and that to punish him after
abandonment, would be to destroy the motive for such abandonment, has found little favor."'
•15P. v. Lee Kong 95 Cal. 666, 17 L. R. A. 626, S. v. Mitchell 170 Mo.
633, 71 S. W. 175. See Stokes v. S. 92 Miss. 415, 21 L. R. A. N. S. 898
where one lying in wait for another was held guilty of an attempt tho the
other never came near. This case was decided under a statute providing
that "any overt act towa ds the commission of a crime should constitute
an attempt."
3
Robinson's Elementary Law sec. 574. See also Stephen's His.
Crim. L. vol. 2, p. 225.
3
-Wharton's Crim. L. 187.
3
GIn Stephens' Hist. Crim. L. vol. 2, p. 226, it is said, "It is not easy
to say on grounds of expediency whether it is or not wise to lay down
the rule that an attempt from which a man voluntarily desists is no
crime. It would be dangerous to lay down such a rule universally.
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In two Pennsylvania cases the court seems to have been of
the opinion that such voluntary abandonment would leave the
actor guiltless,"7 but in a later case the Supreme Court said,
"Subsequent abandonment might prevent the completion of the
crime but could not save from the consequences of acts done." 38
The great weight of authority in other jurisdictions is to
the same effect. "A crime once committed may be pardoned
but cannot be obliterated by repentance.' ,3
If the criminal design is abandoned before an act sufficient
to constitute an attempt is committed no guilt is incurred,"0 and
evidence of a voluntary"1 but not an involuntary 2 abandonment
even after such an act has been committed is admissible to
negative the existence of the specific intent.
W. H. HITCHLER.
31C. v. Tadrick, 1 Super. 566.

C. v. MacGregor, 6 D. R. 344.
1C. v. Eagen, 190 Pa. 10.
"9Lewis v. S. 35 Ala. 389. Glover v. C. 86 Va. 382, Beale 133, P.
Marrs. 12.5 Mich. 376. S. v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 317.
'0Parkard v. S. 30 Ga. 757. "Every criminal design has its locus
poenitentiae." Shannon v. C. 14 Pa. 228.
41S.

v. Allen, 47 Conn. 121.

4'Taylor v. S. 50 Ga. 79, Reg. v. Bam 9 Cox 98.
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MOOT COURT
THE FARMERS' BANK v. JOHN FILSON.
Liability of Indorser of Non-Negotiable gote-Knowledge by
Holder of Maker's Inability to Pay Not Dispensing
with Necessity of Presentment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Adam Kirk made a note for $300 payable to Filson in three months
at 79 Arch Street, Du Bois (the residence of Kirk). This note was
discounted for Filson by the plaintiff bank. On the day it became payable, the cashier of the plaintiff telephoned to Kirk demanding that
he pay it. Kirk replied that he could not pay for a week, but would then
pay. The cashier replied that he must have payment that day and would
send a messenger to get payment. Kirk replied that that would be useless, since he could not pay. The bank then had the note protested and
notice of protest duly given to Filson whom it now sues on his indorsement.
Edwards for Plaintiff.
Rooke for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MARIANELLI, J.-Ordinarily presentment of a note to the maker
thereof is one of the conditions precedent to the liability of an endorser.
This was the law prior to the passage of the Negotiable Instrument
Act of May 16, 1901, and is the law now. On this point sect. 134 of the
act provides: "The instrument must be exhibited to the person from
whom payment is demanded and when it is paid must be delivered up to
the party paying it." The word "exhibited" means to present, show or
produce the instrument to the persons from whom payment is demanded.
But evidently the framers of this act did not contemplate that there
should always be an exhibition of the instrument to the person who is
liable thereon, for in sect. 142 they have provided that "presentment for
payment is dispensed with (1) where after the exercise of reasonable diligence presentment as required by this act cannot be made; (2) where
the drawee is a fictitious person and (3) by waiver of presentment expressed or implied."
It is under subdivision (3) that we base our decision. We hold that
there was in this case an express waiver of presentment by Kirk, the
maker. In this busy age when time is so- valuable, it was quite natural
for the cashier of the bank to call up by telephone the maker of the note
in order so ascertain if presentment would have to be made. Having
been told that the maker could not pay, if presentment were made, we
are unable to see any wisdom in the law, if it required the holder to go
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through the idle ceremony of presenting the note for payment, knowing
that it would not be paid. Law is said to be "the perfection of common
sense" and if we were to hold that presentment in this case was necessary, the definition would be strikingly inapplicable.
A resort to the reason why presentment is acquired will make clearer
the ground of this decision. The party making payment insists on the
presentment of the paper by the party demanding payment, in order to
make sure that it is at the time in his possession and not outstanding in
another; for, if at the time he makes payment it is outstanding, and
held by a bonafle holder for value, he will be liable to pay it again, and
a receipt taken will be no protection. Ogden Neg. Inst. p. 169. Obviously, if the maker cannot or will not pay, he is not confronted with
the probability of a double payment, and he needs no protection from a
danger which cannot possibly visit him. Nor can the defendant complain that the maker was not given an opportunity to pay. The reason
of the rule being absent, the rule itself does not apply. Cessante ratione
ipsa lex cessat.
Not only is our decision sustainable on principle, but there is authority as well. In Sherer v. Easton Bank, 33 Pa. 134 (decided in 1859, but
the law being the same, since, in this respect the act of 1901 is declaratory of the common law) it was held that if the maker of a note payable
at a bank had no funds in the bank when it fell due, demand of payment
was unnecessary. In that case the absence of funds in the bank dispensed
with the formality of demand and presentment; in our case the maker
himself accomplished the same object.
Hollowell & Co. v. Curry, 41
Pa.332.
Gilpin v, Savage, 112 N. Y. S. 802, holds that the statutory right of
the vendor to exhibition of the note is waived and presentment is sufficient where he was callcd up by telephone by the holder, asked what he
was going to do about it and replied that he would not pay. In that
case, the same as in the case at bar, the note was made payable at the
home of the maker on a certain street. Knowledge of the maker's inability to pay the note when due, on account of his insolvency, was held
to amount to an implied waiver of presentment.
O'Bannon Co. v.
Curran, 113 N. Y. S. 369. If the knowledge of such circumstances was
strong enough to raise an implied waiver, afortiori express information
from the maker that he will not be able to pay, if presentment is made,
makes our position free from doubt.
We are aware that the note in suit is not a negotiable instrument,
because it is "payable to Filson" and not to his order or bearer. But the
plaintiff is the immediate endorsee of Filson, who was the payee of the
note in suit; and in respect to the immediate indorsee of the payee of a
non-negotiable promissory note, the indorsement will create the same
liabilities and obligations as the indorsement of a negotiable note. Haber
v. Brown, 101 Cal. 445. The defendant may be treated as having considered his indorsemeut on the note as though it were negotiable. At
any rate he is not defending on the ground that an endorser is not liable
on a non-negotiable instrument. On the other hand, he has chosen to
avoid liability on another ground which we have already held to be untenable.
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Our conclusion is, that where the immediate indorsee of the payee of
a non-negotiable promissory note is informed by the maker thereof, on
the day of maturity, that if presentment is made he will not be able to
pay, and the endorsee protests the note and notice of protest is duly
given to the indorser, the latter is liable on his indorsement.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The note against the indorser of which this suit is brought is not a
negotiable note, and the question presented is, therefore, what is the
liability of an endorser of a non-negotiable note to his immediate endorsee. Upon the question there exists a great conflict of authority
In some states it is held that by such indorsement the same liability is
created as is created by the indorsement of a negotiable instrument.
Haber v. Brown, 101 Cal. 445. In some other states the liability of such
indorser is likened to that of a surety against whom the note is collectible
provided due diligence is exercised in proceeding against the maker.
Castle v. Condee, 16 Com. 223. In still other states it is held that such
indorsement is equivalent to the making of a new note and is a direct,
positive, unconditional undertaking on the part of the indorser to pay
the indorsee. Billingham v. Brown, 10 Ia. 317; Crowell v. Hewitt, 4 N.
Y. 491. In a majority of jurisdictions, however, the liability of such indorsee is defined as that of an assignor of a chose in action. Steere v.
Trebilcock, 108 Mich. 464; Trenton Bank v. Gay, 70 Mo. 627; South
Bend v. Poddock, 31 Xan. 510; Edgewood Co. v. Nowland, 19 Ky. L. Rep.
1740; Pratt v. Thomas, 2 Hill (S. C.) 654.
The last view has been adopted by the courts of Pennsylvania.
Wright v. Hart, 44 Pa. 454; Citizens Bank v. Prollet, 126 Pa. 194; Gray
v. Donohoe, 4 Watts 400; Trevall v. Fitch, 5 Wharton 325; Charnley
Dulles, 8 W. & S. 353; Folwell v. Beaver, 13 S. & R. 311; Shaffstal v.
McDaniel, 152 Pa. 598; Wilson v. Martin, 74 Pa. 159; Howard v. Nichols,
1 Law Times 109.
The assignor of a chose in action impliedly warrants to the assignee
that the chose assigned is a valid subsisting obligation in his favor
against the debtor, but he does not warrant the solvency of the debtor,
or that it, the debt, will be paid at maturity. Flynn v. Allen, 58 Pa.
482; Mohlers Ap. 5 Pa. 318; Jackson v. Crawford, 12 L. & R. 165; Lloyd
v. McNamara, 19 Pa. 130; Stroh v. Hess, 1 W. & S. 153.
The note assigned in this case was a valid subsisting obligation.
The judgment of the learned court below is therefore reversed.
In conclusion we wish to say that even if the note were regotiable,
it is at least doubtful whether the position taken by the learned court
below could be sustained. In Gilpin v. Savage, 201 N. Y. 167; 94 N. E.
656, 34 L. R. A. 417, reversing Gilpin v. Sadage, 112 N. Y. S. 802, it is
held that a demand by telephone of the maker for payment of a note
which is payable at the maker's residence, is not a sufficient presentment
to charge an indorser, although the one making the demand had the
note in his possession at the time the demand is made and so stated to
the maker, who refused to pay.
Judgment reversed.
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ISAAC TRESCOTT v. MARTIN GREGORY.
Deeds -Revestingy of Titles-Statute of Frauds- Intentional
Destruction of Evidence of Title Generally Ineffective
to Revest Ownership-Exception to Rule.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Trescott conveyed a tract of land to Gregory and his heirs for $5,000.
Two years later Gregory, being indebted, and desiring to convert the
land into money, agreed with Trescott, that he, Trescott, should pay him
$5,000; and that he. Gregory, would destroy the deed previously made to
him by Trescott, 'so as to revest the land in the latter. The money was
paid to Gregory and he burned the deed, and he accepted an oral lease,
from year to year, of the premises for the rental of $300 per year. After
occupying the land for four years as tenant, Trescott demands possession.
This is ejectment.
Warrington for Plaintiff.
Landis for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
LONG, J.-Trescott sold land to Gregory. The deed was delivered
to Gregory and the five thousand dollars to Trescott. The sale was consummated.
The questions before the court are: first, whether the destruction of
the deed revested title in Trescott, and if not, then, secondly, whether
such destruction with intent to revest title is an equitable exception to
the rule requiring conveyances of land interests to be in writing.
The first question must be answered in the negative, "An estate
once vested, cannot be divested by the mere annulment and cancellation
of the deed." Tate v. Clement, 176 Pa, 550.
Two years after the original conveyance Gregory became indebted
and Trescott and Gregory agreed to a rescission of the executed contract.
Accordingly, Trescott paid back the $5,000 and Gregory destroyed the
deed with the intention to revest title in Trescott. Gregory then rented
the property and continued in possession four years, paying to Trescott
a yearly rental of $300.
After four years elapsed, Trescott wishing possession of the land
brings ejectment, Trescott has believed himself to be the owner of the
land for four years. During this time he has allowed Gregory to keep
the $5,000, and Gregory in turn has acknowledged Trescott as the owner.
He has paid the rent and claimed no rights of ownership in the land.
Does Gregory's conduct now preclude him from asserting any such rights
of ownership?
It was held in Potter v. Adams, 2 South Western, 490 (Missouri
1894) a grantee who voluntarily destroys an unrecorded deed for the purpose of revestig title in the grantor, is estopped to assert title under
such deed. C. J. Black, in his opinion in this case said: "The destruction and cancellation of a deed after it has been delivered does not revest
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title in the grantor. Where a deed has been lost or destroyed by accident or mistake, evidence may be introduced of its existence, loss and
contents. But a different rule prevails where the grantee has voluntarily destroyed an unrecorded deed for the purpose and with the intention of revesting title in the grantor. In such a case he will not be allowed to prove the contents of the destroyed deed by parol evidence."
Potter v. Adams, 125 Mo. 118; Thomas v. Scott, 221 Mo. 271.
In Gugins v. Van Gorder, 10 Mich. 523, a case where the deed was
destroyed with the same intention, the Court said: "Is the defendant
estopped from introducing parol evidence of title in the original grantor
(Goodrich)? We think he is, under the circumstances stated in the case.
Secondary evidence cannot be received to prove a fact without first laying a foundation for it in accounting for the absence of that which is
primary. The deed is the beat evidence of title. That is not produced,
and its destruction is accounted for in a way that shows it would be dishonest in him to claim anything under it. It was destroyed in pursuance
of an agreement between him and his grantors, after the purchase
money had been returned to him with a view of revesting title. It was
done with his consent, and for a valuable consideration. The law will
not recognize such a state of facts as an excuse for the non production of
the deed."
Where the law reqnires a transaction to be in writing it cannot be
proved by other evidence. Greenleaf on Evidence, Vol. 1, No. 86;
Statute of Frauds, Act Apr. 22, 1856, Vol. 4, P. & L. Dig. 533.
The facts of the case of Bane v. Sutton, 3 Penny. 199, very closely
resemble those of the present case. Sutton conveyed a house to Johnson,
in June, 1871, giving notes for the price. These notes not being paid in
February, 1882, Sutton demanded payment, whereupon Johnson, living
in the same house, went ont, procured his deed, and the notes belonging to
Sutton, brought them back, threw them into the stove, and burned them
aaying, "There, now, you are paid. You have got your property back
just as you had it before."
Johnson then rented the house from Sutton
until 1877, when Johnson's heirs got possession of some of the rooms of
the house (a hotel) claiming under Johnson's title, Holding that the
ownership was revested in Sutton, the court remarks: "It is not the case
of a parol sale from Johnson to Mrs. Sutton so as to permit the statute
of frauds to defeat the effect of the act. It is such an act of spoliation,
followed by the subsequent action of the parties, as to estop him and his
heirs from invoking the aid of that deed."
In the present case Gregory's conduct was similar to that of Johnson. Such were Gregory's acts that he is precluded from asserting
rights of ownership. These acts were: (1) his destruction of the deed
and assertion never to claim the land; (2) his receiving back the $5,000,
and (3) his acting during four years in conformity with his declared intention, by not claiming the land as his own, and by recognizing the
vendor as owner in leasing from him the property.
To the second question the answer is, that such a destruction, with
an intent to revest title, is in the nature of an estoppel, and Gregory is
precluded from claiming title.
Judgment for plaintiff.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The courts are almost unanimous in declaring that the destruction or
cancellation of an unre corded deed or its redelivery to the grantor for
that purpose with intention to reinvest the title in the grantor, will not
have the effect of reinvesting the title in the grantor, for the reason
that title to lands cannot under the statute of frauds be conveyed by
parol. Lutz v. Matthewa, 37 Super Ct. 354; Tate v. Clement, 176 Pa.
550; Cravener v. Bower, 4 Pa. 259; 18 L. R. A. N. S. 1107; Refiner v,
Bowman, 53 Pa. 313.
In spite, however, of the general language in which this rule has
been aaserted, many authorities annul its effect as between the parties by
declaring the grantor to have an equitable title sufficient to entitle him
to the protection of a court of equity, and to defeat any right of action
of the grantee for the property. 18 L. R. A. N. S.1169. This doctrine
is based upon the ground of an estoppel. 9 A. & E. Encyc. 164. It finds
support in Clauerv. Clauer, 22 Super. Ct. (Pa.) 395. In this case a married
woman purchased land, took a deed therefor, paid a part of the purchase
money, and took possession. Subsequently she surrendered possession to
the grantor, gave back the deed, and received back the part of the purchase money which she had paid. As to the effect of these acts on her
part the court said, "Her surrender of the deed to be canceled with the
intention of reconveying the title in the grantor, estops her as effectually
as if she had reconveyed it. She put it out of her power at that time to
prodtice a deed to sustain a title; the fact that she was a married woman
does not change the rules and decisions which have been enforced time
out of mind to prevent frauds." See also Barncord v. Kuhn, 36 Pa. 383.
It will be observed, however, that in this case, as well as in Bane v.
Sutton, 3 Pennypacker, 199, upon which the learned court below relies,
possession was redelivered to the grantee and there was a return of the
purchase money or of the obligations given therefor. In these cases
there was in reality a parol repurchase of the land followed by the payment of the purchase money and a taking of possession. These facts
were of themselves sufficient to take the cases out of the statute of
frauds under the doctrine of part performance.
In the present case Trescott did not take possession of the lands. He
cannot therefore rely upon the doctrine of part performance. "Exclusive possession taken and maintained in pursuance of the parol contract
is an essential ingredient of part performance." P. & L. Dig. Dec. vol.
2 oc 34702 and cases cited.
To hold that the plaintiff in the present case is entitled to recover,
will require us to create an additional exception to the statute of frauds.
We do not wish, and are not compelled by the authorities, to do so.
In Finks' Estate, 21 Pa. the question whether the redelivery of a
a deed to the grantor was effectual to work a rescission of the deed, was
expressly left undecided, In Tate v. Clement 176 Pa. 550, S. conveyed
land to M., his daughter, in fee, by a deed which was not recorded. The
plaintiff claimed that subsequently this deed with the consent of both
parties was "annulled, withdrawn and cancelled."
The court said,
"The plaintiff's own case showed that he had no title. An estate once
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vested cannot be divested by the mere annulment and cancellation of the
deed."
To the same effect is Lutzv. Matthews, 37 Sup. 359.
In Cravener v. Bowser 4 Pa. 259 it appeared that Bowser, by written
articles had sold land to Flanner who entered, cleared, and cultivated it.
Subsequently Flanner "threw up his bargain" with Bowser by a "surrender of the articles of agreement" and made a "parol agreement" to
become Bowser's tenant. In declaring that the relation between Bowser
and Flanner was that of vendor and purchaser, and not that of landlord
and-tenant, the court said: "No case can be found in the books where
the vendee was in actual possession, had paid the purchase money, and
made valuable improvements, where a rescission by parol was adjudged
sufficient to divest him of his estate and reinvest it in the vendor. Can
the act of rescission transfer the title or estate? It is a mere destruction of the written evidence of the vendee's right to demand a conveyance,
but does not the abiding evidence of possession and improvement remain? What difference in principle can exist between the mode of transferring a legal and equitable estate? Yet what lawyer would pretend
that a legal estate, after it had been vested by deed, could be transferred
to the vendor by the destruction of the deed? There must be some
vehicle to carry the estate out of the owner, and if it is not done by a
writing, it cannot be done by a naked parol agreement to rescind or destroy the written evidence of his title. A contrary doctrine would open
a door for and let loose upon society the emphatic mischief which the
statute of frauds was intended to shut out forever."
In support of this decision we refer to the authorities collected in
18 L. R. A. N. S. 1167; 9 A. & E. Encyc, 163.
Judgment reversed.

McDONALD v. DILWORTH.
Trespass-Battery, What Is-Intention of Battery Question
for Jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Dilworth's granary was set on fire and he suspected the plaintiff, a
boy 15 years old, and foulld him present at a second fire which broke out.
The defendant placed his hand on plaintiff's shoulder and asked him if he
felt better after he had set the fire. This is trespass for the battery.
Kountz for Plaintiff.
Dorn for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
McCALL, J.-Let us first learn what a battery is. The least touching of another person wilfully, or in anger, is a battery, for the law
cannot draw a line between different degrees of violence, and therefore
prohibits the first and lowest stage of it, every man's person being
sacred, and no other having a right to meddle with it in the slightest
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manner. 3 Bi. 120, 3 Cyc. 1066-7; 9 L. R. A. 445 n, 1 L. R. A. N. S.
439; Butler v. Stockdale, 19 Sup. (Pa.) 98. An actual specific intent to
injure is not necessary to make an actionable assault and battery.
Cemtes v. Lister, 15 Phila. 46; Mercer v. Corbin, 3 L. R. A. 221.
Coward v. Bradley, (1 Ames 24 & 14 Mews' Eng. Case Law Dig. 225,
230) is relied upon by the defence. This case lays down the principle
"Mere laying of hands on one to attract his attention is not assault and
battery." In the game case it is said "any injury whatever, be it never
so small, being actually done to a person of a man in an angry or revengeful, or rude or insolent manner, as by spitting on his face, or any
touching him in anger or violently jostling him out of way, are batteries
in eye of law."
The facts of this care were that the defendant
touched the arm of the plaintiff who was directing a stream of water on
a fire and directed his attention to another point where a fire had broken
out, whereupon the plaintiff called a policeman and put him under arrest.
But in Richmond v. Fiske, 160 Mass. p. 34, where a milkman, against
express commands of one of his customers, entered latter's sleeping
room in early morning, took hold of his arms and shoulders, and used
sufficient force to awaken him, for the purpose of presenting his bill, he
was held guilty of a battery.
Now, since the law does not draw any line between the different degrees of violence to constitute a battery, the only question to decide in the
case at bar is the intent of the defendant when he did the act. Does this
case fall within Richmond v. Fiske or Coward v. Bradley? In the latter
case the intention was of kindness. There was no evidence that anything
rude or angry was the motive in causing the party to call the fireman's attention to the new outbreak of fire. The evidence rather tended to show
an opposite motive. In Richmond v. Fiske, the court evidenty thought it
was rude and insulting to be awakened out of a sleep to have a milk bil
presented. If such was rude and insulting how much more would it be
so to be accused of having set a buiiding on fire when such an act is by
statute made an indictable offence? It is a crime involving moral turpitude and would subject one to an infamous punishment. There is no
question, then, but that a battery was committed in the case at bar.
And more than nominal demages should be allowed. For the words above
were slanderous and the facts lack but one element to prevent an action
of slander and that is publication. Broker v. Ceffin, 5 Johns, N. Y. 108;
Andres v. Kuppenheafer, 3 S. & R. 255; Davis v. Casey, 141 Pa. 314; and
damages for his humiliation and mental suffering could be recovered in
trespass for battery since that has been established. Richmond v. Fisk,
sutpra.
In a case reported in 53 Vt. 585 Pl., a blind girl was staying in the
house of the defendant over night and in the night time he went into her
room and sat upon her bed soliciting sexual intercourse. In an action
of trespass quare clausum fregit she recovered substantial damages
for her mental suffering owing to his indecent remarks.
Judgment for plaintiff.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
To constitute a battery there must be an application of force by one
person upon the person of another, but every application of force by one
person upon another is not a battery.
I The application of the force derives its tortious caste not from the
degree or intensity of the force applied nor necessarily, from the want
of consent of the person to whom the force is applied, but from the intent with which the force is applied.
The wrong consists not in the touching, nor in the amount thereof,
but in the spirit or intent with which it is done.
An intentional touching is frequently justified by the common usage
of civil intercourse, and such touching, pushing or the like as is incident
to the ordinary conduct of life and is free from the use of unnecessary
force, is not tortious. Pollock on Torts 185. "Every laying on hands is
not a battery. The party's intention must be considered, for sometimes
people will, by way of joke or friendship, clap a man on the back, and it
would be ridiculous to say that every such touching constitutes a battery." William v. Jones, Hard. 301, per Ld. Hardwicke.
On the other hand, if the intention is to injure, the touching is unlawful, and this is so whether the intended injury is bodily pain, a sense
of shame or other disagreeable emotion of the mind. 3 Cvc. 1033.
In the present case the defendant placed his hand upon the plaintiff's
shoulder and at the same time accused him of a crime. It is a reasonable inference that the purpose of such touching accompanied by the accusation of crime was to intimidate or frighten the plaintiff. Such
touching is not justified by the "common usage of civil intercourse" nor
is it incident to "the ordinary conduct of life."
The learned court below committed no error in submitting the case
to the jury.
In Crawford v. Bergen, Iowa 60 N. W. 205, where the facts were similar to those of the case at bar, the preponderance of the evidence was to
the effect that "the defendant placed his hand on plaintiff's shoulder and
asked him if he felt better after he had set the fire." The court held
that it was a fair question for the jury whether the touching of the
plaintiff should be regarded as a battery.
Judgment affirmed.

FOX v. MULLIN.
Liability of Lunatic for Causing Frighit.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Mullin a harmless lunatic entered a house in which Mrs. Fox rented
a room and behaved in such an unusuul manner as to make it evident
that he was crazy. The plaintiff being pregnant took fright and suffer-
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ed a miscarriage. Defendant poked his head into her room but did not
enter it.
The plaintiff seeks, in this action, damages for mere fright unaccompanied by physical injury.
Storey for Plaintiff.
Peppets for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
EVANS, J.-The rule in Pennsylvania and many other states is,
"There can be no recovery of damages for bodily and mental suffering resulting from fright unconnected with physical injury." Fox v. Borkey 126
Pa. 164; Ewingv. R. R. Co. 147 Pa. 40; Lynn v. Duquesne Boro, 204 Pa. 551;
Chittick v. Rapid Transit Co. 224 Pa. 13; Houston v. Freemansburg, 212
Pa. 548; Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. 151 N. Y. 107; Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry. Co. 168 Mass. 285; White v. Sander 168 Mass. 298; Hampton v.
Jones 58 Iowa 317; and Morris v. Lacka. and Wyo. Valley R. R. Co. 228
Pa. 198.
The plaintiff contends that Mullin is liable for his torts and lunacy
is no defense to a recovery of compensatory damages, 3 Sup. Ct. 432.
Undoubtedly there is great hardship and even injustice in such a rulein compelling one to respond for that which, for want of the control of
reason, he was unable to avoid: That is imposing upon a person already
visited with the inexpressible calamity of mental obscurity, an obligation
to observe the same care and precaution respecting the rights of others
that the law demands of persons in full possession of their faculties.
The second contention is that Mullin was trespassing and the suffering was .the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's unusual conduct. This contention is erroneous. The trespass of a harmless
lunatic accompanied by unusual behavior not coming within reach of the
plaintiff nor even into her room cannot be said to be the natural and
probable consequence of his acts with reference to a miscarriage. In
determining what is the proximate cause, the rule is, "that the injury
must be the natural and probable consequence of the negligent act; such
a consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of the case might
and aught to have seen by the wrongdoer, as likely to flow from his act.
104 Pa. 306, 93 Pa. 498, 46 Pa. 192. Vale vol. 11 p. 1131. Even if we attribute the same amount of foresight to the lunatic as to a sane man,
yet it is absurd to assume a sane man could anticipate such a result. In
view of Ewing vs. Ry. Co. 147 Pa. 40, that when the consequence of
fright could not have been forseen, the act was not the proximate cause
and on the ground of remoteness our decision should go for the defendant.
To make out a cause of action the plaintiff must establish not only that defendant was guilty of a negligent act; but that the injury was produced by
a cause which might naturally and reasonably be expected to follow the
negligent act. Tutein v. Hurley 98 Mass. 211, Lowery v. M. R. Co. 99
N. Y. 158; Ewing v. Ry. Co., 147 Pa. 40. Fright alone, occasioned by
the negligent act of another person cannot be made the basis of an action.
Wyman v. Leavitt 71 Me. 227. Canning v. Williamstown 1 Cush, 451.
Creamer, v. N. E. R. R. Co. 156 Mass. 320.
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Ewing v. Ry. Co. is a particularly strong case for it was decided on
a demurrer to the statement, setting forth a collision of the cars through
the negligence of the defendant by which the cars were overturned and
thrown against the dwelling house of the plaintiff, subjecting her to great
fright, fear and nervous excitement and distress whereby she became
sick and disabled from her usual house work, etc. The question was
squarely presented stripped of all its complicating circumstances, and the
court said unaminously, per curiam, that there was no cause of action.
In Spade v. Lynn and Boston R. R. Co. supra, it was held, there could
be no recovery for fright and mental suffering nor for bodily injury resulting solely from mental distress. The exemption from liability is
based not on the ground that fright and anxiety do not constitute actual
injury or that mental and physical effect may not be directly traceable
as a consequence of unintentional negligence; but on the ground that in
practice it is impossible to administer any other rule without opening a
wide door to unjust claims, which cannot be satisfactorily met. The decided trend of decision both in this country and in England is against the
maintainance of such actions, or the allowance for mental suffering as an
element of damages when distinct from physical injury. In Augusta v.
Sommerville R. R. Co. v. Randall 85 Ga. 297, it was held that the mental suffering because of disappointed hopes caused by the premature birth
of a child as a result of an injury was not the subject of compensation.
In Wyman v. Leavitt supra. recovery was denied for fright and anxiety
caused by the apprehension of danger. In Smith v. Postal Telegraph
Cable, Co. 174 Mass., no recovery was allowed for sickness due to fright
caused by rocks being thrown upon one's house by a blast near by of
which she had no notice. In Morris v. Lacka. & Wyo. Valley R. R. Co.
228 Pa. 198 the plaintiff claimed damages for a miscarriage caused by a
nervous shock, to which she was subjected while riding iil the defendant's
electric car, which bumped over the tracks at an open switch. There
was evidence of negligence, yet it was stated, "that there can be no recovery of damages for bodily or mental suffering resulting from fright
unconnected with physical injury." This is a very much stronger case than
the one at bar and when we note the fact, it was decided in 1910, and is
in line with all the leading cases in Pennsylvania on the subject, the plaintiff's case appears hopeless.
There are two prominent reasons why Pennsylvania courts have taken this "seemingly" arbitrary view, that no recovery can be had for
mental and bodily suffering unaccompanied by physical injury; 1st. "The
scope of accident cases would be greatly enlarged," and we also agree
that it is the business of the courts to administer justice; but the difficulty of furnishing safe proof of its existence and degree is a justification for their refusing redress. 2nd. That the defendant cannot anticipate
every kind of corporal injury that may follow from the fright caused by
the act. This seems very reasonable. Let us take a supposititious case.
A acts foolishly with the intention to frighten B. Must A anticipate that
he will kill B by a little fright, or that B will become a hopeless lunatic
or give a premature birth ? Thequestion itself speaks negatively, and it
suggests another question. Why do we not regard the plaintiff by the same
strict rule as we do Mullin, the lunatic ? 0 Is it more unreasonable to judge
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her an ordinaryly strong healthy woman, than to impose on a lunatic the
same care and precaution as the law demands of persons in full possession of their faculties ? It again speaks in the negative.
With the realization of the plaintiff's serious mishap and due respect
to the authorities cited by the learned counsel, I feel bound both by the
law on the subject and the equity of such a case to decide in favor of
the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The defendant is alleged to have committed a wrong. Our task will
be to ascertain whether this allegation is supported by the evidence.
He beIt appears that he was a "lunatic," a "harmless lunatic."
haved in such a way as to reveal his lunacy to observers, "as to make it
Is it wrong to be a lunatic, and to seem to
evident that he was crazy."
be a lunatic? Hardly. A man may be ugly, corporeally deformed,
mentally deformed, without infringing any right of any other human
being. --Other human beings may dislike deformity, find it shocking and
abborrent. It is not the duty of one man to refrain from being crazy
because other men are so hyperesthetic, as to be disgusted, pained, or
frightened by the sight of him. If Mrs. Fox chooses to take fright when
lunatics show themselves, she cannot say that in letting themselves be
seen, they have committed a wrong against her; that they should have
put a veil over their faces, or submitted to confinement in a cell.
But, it is suggested that this defendant, not content with being and
evidently being a lunatic, committed a tort in being in the house, or in
"poking his head" into the plaintiff's room.
Precisely what this tort was, does not appear. He entered the house.
But did he do so with the express or tacit invitation of the owner or
tenant? Was he a trespasser? It does not appear that he was. If he
was, it would not follow that he became liable to Mrs. Fox. She was not
the owner or the tenant of the house. The fact that, while committing
a trespass against the owner, he showed himself to Mrs. Fox, could
hardly be thought to entitle her to sue, if his mere apparition could not
have entitled her. How she could found a right upon a breach of a duty
to another, is not clear.
"The case of Troth v. Wills, 8 Super. 1, is brought to our attention.
There were atrong dissents from the judgment there pronounced. Had
the plaintiff not been a member of the family of the owner of the land
on which the cow intruded and, as such, and as an agent of the owner,
made the effort to expel the cow, during which she was gored, the decision would probably have been different. If instead of holding such a
relati, n, she had been a mere licensee walkink over the ground, or a
trespasser, it would be extremely difficult to believe that so learned a
court would have held that she acquired through the cow's trespass
a right which she otherwise could not have had; to be compensated for
the injury.
But, the lunatic defendant was not merely a trespasser in the house,
it is said; he was a trespasser in the plaintiff's room, a trespasser within
or upon her clavsun. We are not prepared to concede this. In White
v. Maynard, 111 Mass. 250, it is maintained that a roomer and boarder
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"acquires no interest in the real estate." He cannot maintain ejectment. He can maintain no action founded on possession, either against a
person under whom he is a roomer, or against a stranger. So far as ap.
pears, the defendant was not a trespasser. Perhaps however, if the action of trespass quare clausum fregit is not open to Mrs. Fox, she would
be entitled to some other action for the disturbance of her sole [if not
possession, shall we say] lodgment. Possibly so. She ought to have
such action, if she has not.
We have not felt sure whether the cause of the fright which produced the abortion, was the being in the house or the poking of the head
into the room. The special verdict is that Mullin entered a house and
behaved in an unusual way, and that the plaintiff took fright, etc. If the
poking of the head into the room, followed the affright, it is impossible
to perceive its relevancy. The verdict says that the defendant did not
enter. But if his head or any part of it was put within the threshold,
he, or that part of him, entered the room. We shall assume that he, the
whole of him, entered the room. That act, if wrongful, could have given
a right only to a trifling compensation, unless the effect of it was serious.
We fail to see that the fright was the consequence of the intrusion.
Would Mrs. Fox not have been scared, if she had seen Mullin just outside the door? She probably would have been. Perhaps she would not
have been. Perhaps the fear was awakened by the purpose of Mullin to
enter the room made apparent by his poking his head inside, though from
poking the head only inside, could hardly be inferred that there was
such purpose. If the fright was not caused by the entrance, of one-third
or one-half of the defendant's head, then there can be no liability for its
consequence. Let us however suppose that it was thus caused.
It is a principle widely applicable that of a tort, the doer is liable
only for the natural and probable consequences. "Natural" in this relation is not illuminating. Were the fright and the miscarriage, the expectable result? Was it day or night? Was Mullin armed or without
weapon? Were other people in the house; in the next room possibly; in
the hall possibly? Nothing shows that even a sane man ought to have
foreseen that fright would ensue. But would a sane man have to keep
in mind, the possibility that the woman was gravid and that fright would
work an abortion? Hardly. Mullin probably did not know that abortion
followed fright, or fright the display of himself in a door. The law allows for the incompetence of immature persons 'to attend, to see and
hear closely, to remember well, to control their muscular movements.
Their inexperience of the interrelation of things as cause and effect, excuses them in cases in which an adult would not be excused. But, how
should it matter whether this incapacity to foresee, is due to extreme
youth or due to arrested nerve and cerebral development? We concede
however, that this reasoning is inconsistent with some cases. Cf. Ins.
Co. v. Showalter, 3 Super. 452; Shepherd v. Wood, 2 Lanc. L. Rev. 175.
It is suggested that the principle which limits liability to the forseeable consequences, is not applicable when these consequences are the
consequences of a tort against property rights. We are not ready to
concede this. Property is no more sacred than person. One whose act
may affect the bodies of others, owes to them the duty of care to avoid
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injuring them. But, if he violates this duty, he is not responsible for
every actual consequence. Nor is he, if trespassing on land, or against
personalty, responsible for damages of an unimaginable and unpredictable kind.
The first effect of the apparation of Mullen at the door was fright,
the second or third effect, mediated through the fright, was the abortion. Indefensible as is the doctrine, it obtains in Pennsylvania, that
for such effect, there is no right to compensation. The cases cited by
the learned court below maintain this doctrine. In Talbot v. Abinger,
14 Dick. Law Review, 109, we have had occasion to comment on most of
the Pennsylvania cases.'
It is suggested however, that this doctrine is not applicable when
the fright was occasioned by a tort to property or person. We can not
accept this as a limitation. There are no torts, except torts to person or
property; Nay, there are no torts except to person. Duties are not owed
to things but to the owners of things. The reasons assigned for disallowing damages for injury through fright apply to any injuries from
fright.
The courts illogically make a sensible exception, when the
fright and the resulting harm were purposed. The desire to penalize the
malice overcomes the scruple concerning the risk of fabricating injuries
through psychic states.
This opinion is unduly long already. We have concluded that although the lunatic defendant did a wrong (or what, if done by a sane
man would have been a wrong) in presenting himself at the door, he is
not responsible for the consequences of the ensuing fright of the plantiff.
Affirmed.

